Abstract. Dynamic multi-resource fair allocation has been a hot topic for fair division.
Introduction
With the ever-growing demand for cloud resources, multi-resource (such as CPUs, memory, and bandwidth) fair allocation became a fundamental problem in cloud computing systems. The traditional slot-based scheduler for state-of-the-art cloud computing frameworks (for example, Hapdoop) can lead to poor performance, unfairly punishing certain workloads. Ghodsi et al. [4] proposed a compelling alternative known as the dominant resource fairness (DRF) mechanism, which is to maximize the minimum dominant share of users, where the dominant share is the maximum share of any resource allocated to that user. DRF is generally applicable to multi-resource environments where users have heterogeneous demands, and is now implemented in the Hadoop Next Generation Fair Scheduler.
In recent years, DRF has attracted much attention and been generalized to many dimensions. Joe-Wong et al. [11] designed a unifying multi-resource allocation framework that captures the trade-offs between fairness and efficiency, which generalizes the DRF measure. Gutman and Nisan [5] situated DRF in a common economics framework, obtaining a general economic perspective. Bhattacharya et al. [1] generalized DRF to a hierarchical scheduler that offers service isolations in a computing system with a hierarchical structure. Parkes et al. [8] extended DRF in several ways, including the presence of zero demands and the case of indivisible tasks. Li et al. [7] extended DRF to the finite case, where the number of tasks for each user is bounded. Wang et al. [10] generalized the DRF measure into the cloud computing systems with heterogeneous servers. Psomans and Schwartz [9] , and Friedman, Ghodsi, and Psomas [3] studied the multi-resource allocation of discrete tasks on multiple machines. Most recently, Zarchy, Hay and Schapira [12] developed a framework for fair resource allocation that captures such implementation tradeoffs by allowing users to submit multiple resource demands. DRF uses complete information about the requirements of all agents in order to find the fair solution. However, in reality, agents arrive over time, and we do not know the requirements of forthcoming agents before allocating the resources to the arrived agents.
Recently, Kash, Procaccia and Shah [6] introduced a dynamic model of fair division and proposed a dynamic DRF mechanism. They [6] mentioned that a dynamic DRF solution can be found by using water-filling algorithm or solving the corresponding linear program.
However, the running time of the water-filling algorithm is pseudo-polynomial in worstcase scenario. Although solving a linear program can be done within polynomial time, the running time is high. It is desired to design an efficient algorithm to find a dynamic DRF solution.
In this paper, we further study the dynamic DRF mechanism proposed by Kash, Procaccia and Shah [6] . The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic DRF mechanism and the desired fair properties. Section 3 presents a combinatorial optimal algorithm, which can find a dynamic DRF solution in O(k) time at every step k. Section 4 gives the competitive ratio analysis of the dynamic DRF mechanism.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and gives the future work.
Dynamic Dominant Resource Fairness
Throughout this paper, assume that resources are divisible. In a multi-resource environment, there are n agents and m resources. Each agent i requires D ir -fraction of resource r for each task, where D ir > 0 for each resource r. As defined in [4] , the dominant resource of agent i is the resource r such that D ir = max r ′ D ir ′ , and D ir is called its dominant share.
Following [6, 8] , the normalized demand vector of agent i is given by
In the dynamic resource allocation model considered in [6] , agents arrive at different times and do not depart. Assume that agent 1 arrives first, then agent 2, and in general agent k arrives after agents 1, . . ., k − 1; say that agent k arrives in step k. An agent reports its demand when it arrives and the demand does not change over time. Thus, at step k, demand vectors d 1 , . . ., d k are known, and demand vectors d k+1 , . . ., d n are unknown. At each step k, a dynamic DRF mechanism produces an allocation A k over the agents present in the system, where A k allocates A k ir -fraction of resource r to agent i, subject to the feasibility condition
Under the dynamic DRF mechanism, assume that allocations are irrevocable, i.e.,
ir , for every step k ≥ 2, every agent i ≤ k − 1, and every resource r. At every step k, assume A k is non-wasteful, which means that for every agent i there exists y ∈ R + such that for every resource r, A
At every step k, the dynamic DRF mechanism [6] starts from the current allocation among the present agents 1, . . . , k and keeps allocating resources to agents that have the minimum dominant share synchronously, until a k/n fraction of at least one resource is allocated.
Formally, at every step k, the dominant share vector (x k 1 , . . . , x k k ) of the dynamic DRF allocation A k can be obtained by solving the following linear program:
As shown in [6] , the dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies the following fairness properties:
1. Sharing Incentives (SI). For all step k and all agents i ≤ k, x k i ≥ 1/n, i.e., when an agent arrives it receives an allocation that it likes at least as much as an equal split of the resources.
Dynamic Envy Freeness (DEF). For all step k and all agents
j , i.e., an agent i envies an agent j only if j arrived before i did, and j has not been allocated any resources since i arrived.
Dynamic Pareto Optimality (DPO)
. For all step k, there is a resource r such
.e., it should not be possible to increase the allocation of an agent without decreasing the allocation of at least another user.
Strate-proofness (SP)
. For all step k, agents should not be able to benefit by lying about their resource demands, regardless of the reported demands of other agents.
A linear-time algorithm
Obviously, it is unreasonable to compute a dynamic DRF solution by solving the linear program (1), as the running time is high. The water-filling algorithm can produce a dynamic DRF solution, too. However, the running time of water-filling algorithm is pseudo-polynomial [5] . In this section, we will design a linear-time algorithm to find a dynamic DRF solution. In the proof below, M k and x k i refer to the optimal solution of (1) in step k. The following three lemmas in [6] are very useful for designing faster algorithm. Lemma 1. At any step k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it holds that
Lemma 2. At any step k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all agents i, j such that i < j, it holds that Proof. Based on Lemmas 1-3, at any step k ≥ 2, there is an agent τ ≤ k − 1 such that
where
following from the maximality of M k and the algorithm in [8] .
We are now ready to describe our linear-time algorithm. At any step k ≥ 2, consider
, for i < l;
For convenience, let
, ∀r; and l ≥ τ . Otherwise, we have M k < x k−1 l and l < τ . We distinguish the following two cases: The complete algorithm is given as Algorithm 1: Dynamic DRF.
else, do 9:
while UB − LB > 1, do
15: else, do
16:
LB ← τ , UB ← UB, τ ← ⌈(LB + UB)/2⌉;
17:
end if;
19: end while;
20: end if;
25: end while
In [6] , the authors analyzed the performance of the dynamic DRF mechanism on real data, for two objectives: the sum of dominant shares (the maxsum objective) and the minimum dominant share (the maxmin objective) of the agent present in the system. In this section, we analyze the performance of the dynamic DRF mechanism in the worst-case scenario.
For a maximization problem, the competitive ratio ρ of an online algorithm is the worst-case ratio between the cost of the solution found by the online algorithm and the cost of an optimal solution in an offline setting where all the demands of agents are known [2] . Clearly, ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, we define the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism as the worst-case ratio between the objective value of the dynamic DRF solution and the DRF solution. Formally, for a given instance I, at every step k, let (ẋ k 1 , . . . ,ẋ k k ) be the DRF solution, which can be obtained bẏ
following from [5, 8] . Accordingly, the competitive ratio CR of the dynamic DRF mechanism is defined as
Since the DRF mechanism has complete knowledge of future demands, the objective value of (ẋ k 1 , . . . ,ẋ k k ) should be more than that of (x k 1 , . . . , x k k ) at every step k for any instance I. Otherwise, the objective is not suitable for the definition of competitive ratio.
When the objective is the sum of dominant shares maximization [6] , the competitive ratio CR 1 of the dynamic DRF mechanism can be defined as
However, CR 1 is unreasonable, as the sum of dominant shares of the dynamic DRF solution maybe more than that of the DRF solution, i.e., Theorem 2. When the objective is minimum dominant share maximization, the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism is nearly 1/m. Moreover, the dynamic DRF mechanism is almost the optimal dynamic mechanism satisfying DPO.
Proof. At every step k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, since the dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies the SI property, we have x k k ≥ 1/n. By the pigeonhole principle, there exists a source which is the dominant resource for at least ⌈k/m⌉ agents. It implies that the DRF solution
Thus, the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies CR 2 ≥ ⌈k/m⌉/k ≥ 1/m.
Consider a setting with m resources and n = m 2 + 1 agents. The demand vectors of the agents are as follows:
where ǫ → 0 is a small enough number. At step k = m 2 , the dynamic DRF solution is
, following from the assumption of ǫ. Actually, any dynamic mechanism satisfying the DPO property will allocate all the resources to the first k = m 
Conclusion and Future Work
We have described a non-trivial optimal algorithm to find a dynamic DRF allocation, whose running time is linear in the number of present agents at every step, improving the result in [6] . We have also analyzed the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism, which shows that the dynamic DRF mechanism is a nearly optimal mechanism satisfying DPO.
Note that Kash, Procaccia and Shah [6] developed another fair allocation mechanism, called cautious LP, which achieves near optimal maxmin value at the last step. Clearly, since cautious LP violates the DPO property and allocates too many resources at the last several steps, it is unfair to compare cautious LP with dynamic DRF for the maxmin objective. It is interesting to analyze the competitive ratio of the cautious LP mechanism under different objectives. Since solving the linear program takes too much time, it is challenging to develop a combinatorial algorithm to find a cautious LP solution as in
